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GOOD GOVERNANCE AND NEPAD

By

Mr. Basil O. Oshionebo

Introduction

A common experience among African countries is that at one time or the other in their economic history, they have undertaken some macro-economic reforms under the auspices of the Bretton Woods Institutions. Although these international financial institutions have, by and large, professionally discharged their obligations to their client African states, macroeconomic performance continues to be poor in the continent. The consequence is that in spite of the widespread optimism at independence regarding their potential for sustainable development, most African states are today in a deplorable state of underdevelopment. This is in spite of decades of conceptualising, formulating and implementing various development policies and programmes. It is, therefore, no surprise that there is a growing recognition among multilateral financial institutions, the international donor community and their beneficiary nation-states that respecting IMF conditionality and thereby correcting macro-economic imbalances, reducing inflation and undertaking key trade, exchange, and other market reforms are not enough to improve efficiency and support sustained economic growth. Expectedly, the most topical issue in the contemporary development arena is the link between governance, on the one hand, and economic development, on the other.

While continuing economic and market reforms are critically important, the contemporary reality is that a much broader range of institutional reforms is needed if countries are to establish and maintain private sector confidence and thereby lay the basis for sustained growth. It was in this regard that the International Monetary Fund, for example, in its 1996 "Partnership for Sustainable Global Growth" identified "promoting good governance in all its aspects, including the rule of law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption "as an essential element of a framework within which economies can prosper". As would be expected, this framework includes,

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“the development of institutions and administrative systems that eliminate the opportunity for bribery, corruption, and fraudulent activity in the management of public resources” (IMF, 1997). Rose-Ackerman (1997) aptly captures this trans-national mood when she asserts that:

“Widespread corruption is a symptom of a poorly functioning state. Because such states can undermine economic growth, international development organisations have started to focus on corruption as part of a general rethinking of their role in the post-cold war world. Increasing emphasis is being placed on creating institutional structures favourable to economic development”

Creating institutional structures favourable to economic development equally requires a consistent and regulatory framework and a functioning and independent judiciary. This explains why the African Development Bank (1999) insists that “rule-based governance is critical to creating an enabling environment and promoting socio-economic development in the 21st century”. If transparently and accountably operated, a rule-based framework generates business confidence, discourages corrupt practices and contributes to the creation of an enabling environment for vibrant private sector activity. If such a transparent and predictable framework is absent, room is created for the use of discretionary powers that may result in rent-seeking and corruption. Improving governance, not only to limit the opportunity for corruption, but also to increase the likelihood of exposing instances of poor governance is part of this advocacy.

It is against the background of the foregoing introductory comments that the next section (2) discusses the rising incidence of poverty in Africa (and Nigeria) so as to contextualise the growing importance of “good governance” if the situation is to be reversed. Section 3 explores the concept of good governance and annotates its components and attributes. Section 4 traces the origins of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and discusses its mission and objectives.

Section 5 relates NEPAD and good governance and discusses the resolve of African leaders to respect the precepts of good governance in the management of their economies. Section 6 discusses good governance imperatives if NEPAD is to succeed. Section 7 concludes the paper.

2. The Challenge of Development in Africa

Africa's underdevelopment is underscored by its poor economic performance which is exemplified, among others, by (African Development Bank, 1999):

- (i) Low domestic savings rates which have averaged 17 per cent (of GDP) from the late 1990s. Low savings have constrained regional investment and growth;
- (ii) Widespread fiscal imbalances (i.e. budget deficits) due chiefly to shortfalls in export volumes and lower commodity prices;
- (iii) Shortfalls in agricultural output due to civil strife (conflicts and wars), occasional drought, the AIDS epidemic, misdirected policies and general mismanagement. Currently, Southern African countries are most adversely affected;
- (iv) High external indebtedness, which averages half of GDP and almost two and a half times exports. The indebtedness is currently estimated at about 320 billion US dollars. Approximately, a quarter of total export proceeds is devoted to servicing external debt. Indeed, 33 of the 41 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) are in Africa;
- (v) Industrial production is weak, with manufacturing contributing less than 15 per cent of GDP in most countries;
- (vi) African mining is always adversely affected by the vagaries of the world economy (e.g. recently by the East Asian economic crisis and the slow down in World economic growth). Indeed, the World Bank is projecting that the terms of trade of primary commodity exports will deteriorate up to 2007; and

- (vii) Although the process of industrial modernization continues, Africa's industrial production performance remains weak and inadequate to achieve the rapid growth the region needs to rapidly reduce poverty and unemployment;

Poverty is so pervasive in Africa that the ADB (1999) estimates that almost half of its population lives in absolute poverty, "and with about 30 per cent classified as extremely poor - living on less than \$1 a day". In addition, Africa is one of the few regions where per capita incomes have fallen over the past twenty years. Indeed, the average income per capita is lower than at the end of the 1960s. It averaged about US \$315 in 1997. As Ekpo (2002) suggests, if "this figure is expressed in terms of purchasing power parity (accounting for higher costs and prices in Africa) then the real income averaged one-third less than in South Asia, making Africa the poorest region in the World". The World Bank (2000) puts the underdevelopment picture more graphically. It reports that "the region's total income is not much more than Belgium's and is divided among 48 countries with median GDP of just over \$2 billion about the output of a town of 60,000 in a rich country". Africa's foreign debt burden by 1997 was more than 80 per cent of GDP in net present value terms. It is against this background that the ADB (1999) warns that "with the population growing by 2.8 per cent each year, the number of people living in poverty is increasing." The Centre for the Study of African Economies (2001) is equally alarmed by the widespread poverty and reminds us of the efficacy of economic growth in addressing the problem. It concludes that:

"In many African countries the decline of the 1970s and 1980s has been arrested by substantial economic reforms but, for many, there is little evidence of rapid growth. Without such growth the problems of poverty in Africa will remain intractable"

Ihonvhere (1995) sums up Africa's development predicament when he states:

"Africa continues to find itself in grave socio-economic and political crisis. This crisis is evidenced not only in the unprecedented deterioration and dislocation of the quality of life across class, gender and nation, but also in conditions of instability, violence, uncertainty, and general disillusionment. On all indicators of development, Africa simply lags behind other regions of the world. It is today the most debt-distressed, most poverty-stricken, most vulnerable, most marginalised, least industrialised, and most crisis-ridden region of the developing world".

Nigeria's development report since independence eloquently bears out the link between good governance and societal development. Nigeria is abundantly blessed with enormous human and physical resources that should translate to a good standard of living. In spite of all these endowments, the poor performance of the Nigerian economy in many sectors is very evident. The real sector (manufacturing and agriculture) is performing rather poorly. While the country imports a lot of the agricultural produce that its citizens consume, the capacity utilization in industry is around 40%. The country's per capita gross national product, which was as high as \$1,281.4 in 1980, declined continuously to its lowest level of \$240.0 in 1992, standing at around \$250.0 in 1995 and at \$270.0 in 1997, roughly the same figure it was in 1972 (Obadan and Odusola, 1999). That figure is still below \$300.0 as at today. Nigeria therefore represents a paradox of being rich while its citizens are poor and deprived (World Bank, 1996). In this regard, Ayorinde and Uga (1999) aptly remarked that:

"The tapping of the country's rich endowment of various resources has not culminated in improved living conditions for the majority of the people. This paradox is especially spectacular because a vast windfall of oil wealth produced such meagre result. The country is groaning with problems and most of the people remain poor"

The present administration has made strident efforts at redressing the various crises and reviving the economy but the fact remains that in the year 2000, the economy "neither improved nor deteriorated significantly (but) was static, and still low-income, low-growth, with distortions in several markets". Indeed, President Olusegun Obasanjo made reference to the static nature of the economy while presenting the 2001 Appreciation Bill to the National Assembly in November 2000 when he asserted that "for this Government and most Nigerians, our hard-won democracy is yet to translate into significant improvements in our lives" (Taiwo, 2001).

The economy may be experiencing some gains but these are only moderate, particularly given the resource disbursements on the country's development efforts. Nigeria's development indices point to a low rate of economic growth, low capacity utilization in the industrial sector, poorly performing utilities/ infrastructure and the attendant increase in operating costs, among others. The Nigerian economy is therefore embattled on all fronts and with crises of ramifying description, including the energy crisis, the education crisis, the unemployment crisis, the food crisis, the transportation crisis, the debt crisis and, of course, the crisis of economic management. The overall consequence of these macroeconomic problems is the deplorable poverty profile of Nigerians. It is therefore no surprise that the Human Development Index for Nigeria (a measure of the overall quality of life of the average Nigerian) is very low. It is 0.4 compared to the 0.6 average for all developing countries. Indeed, according to the 1998 Nigerian Human Development Report published by the UNDP, Nigeria has become one of the twenty-five poorest countries in the world. As a study by the Federal Ministry of Finance in collaboration with the World Bank remarks (FRN, 2000).

"The level of poverty in Nigeria remains high. In 1980, out of the population of 65 million, 17.7 million, amounting to 28.1 percent of the population, were adjudged poor. In 1996, with a population of 102.3 million, the percentage of the population estimated to be living below the poverty line had increased to 65.6 percent with the total number of the

poor people in Nigeria amounting to 67.1 million".

Indeed, the poverty profile of Nigerians appears to be worsening. The UNDP's Human Development Report for 2001 places Nigeria at No. 148 out of the 173 countries surveyed. The situation was marginally worse with the 2003 report which puts Nigeria at 152 among the 175 countries covered in the survey. Official statistics indicate that the national incidence of poverty has remarkably risen from a modest level of 15 per cent in 1960 to 28 per cent in 1980. It rose further to 46 per cent in 1985 and to 66 percent in 1996. As at 2001, it was estimated to stand at over 70 per cent (FRN, 2001; Obadan, 2001)

It needs to be emphasized that about three decades of successive opaque military dictatorships led to this continued state of underdevelopment. As Obadan (1998) affirms, "Nigeria's rate of economic decline compared to the advancement of some countries that were at about the same level of development in the early 1960s is a pointer to failed political leadership which mismanaged the country's abundant resources". It is the same experience all over Africa whose low economic performance over time is largely attributable to lack of transparency and accountability as well as widespread corruption. The state and its public bureaucracy are largely to blame for this phenomenon. As Olowu (1993) asserts, "these two institutions have turned out to be not only highly centralised and unaccountable, they have been opaque, corrupt, self-serving and insensitive to the economic fortunes and misfortunes of their respective countries". Geislerova (2001) agrees by suggesting that "the main constraint to good governance in Africa is not so much lack of resources as the unwillingness of African leaders to govern well".

Good governance is therefore at the centre-stage of the prevailing paradigm that professes that no matter the quality of macro-economic policy and management, economic performance is invariably a reflection of the extent to which the government respects internationally accepted norms and standards of purposeful use and dispensation of state power

(Ariyo, 1999). It is now generally acknowledged that an oppressive use of state power is inimical to good economic performance. Instead, the state should install and allow the proper functioning of institutions that guide and monitor economic and social relations. These institutions also provide checks and balances against abuse of power by the government. This is why the nature of governance influences the success of macroeconomic policy as well as sustainable growth and development. It is not by co-incidence that the just-born New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is predicated on "longer-term political changes that would attempt to entrench the rule of law, good government and business codes among participating countries". (The Economist, as quoted in the Punch Newspaper, July 1, 2002)

3. Meaning and Scope of Good Governance

3.1 *The Meaning of "Government"*

We need, ab initio, to explore and appreciate the relationship between "government", on the one hand, and "governance", on the other. Government is simply the framework of institutions and functionaries or officials that a state uses in running its affairs. A government is regarded as good if it provides a responsive governmental and state administrative framework that facilitates good governance. Although good governance and economic development must be longer-term goals than good government, the former will not be achievable without the latter. According to the British Council (1993), good government would, in practice, mean:

- (i) A legitimate and representative government following democratic elections;
- (ii) An accountable administration and a responsive government characterized by free-flowing information, separation of powers, effective internal and external auditing, low levels of corruption and nepotism, competent officials (including trained public servants), realistic policies, and low defence expenditure;

- (iii) Governmental respect for human rights, as indicated by freedom of religion and movement, impartial and accessible criminal justice systems, and the absence of arbitrary government power.

The foregoing characterization suggests that democracy symbolizes “good government”. Indeed, a democratic dispensation is considered as being so efficacious in pushing the frontiers of development that some authorities see it as being co-terminous with governance. In this regard, Boeninger (1991) simply defines governance as “good government of society (which) guides a country along a course leading to a desired goal- in this case development”. Development, here, is construed to mean equity, social justice, and the exercise of basic human rights. The point to note, however, is that this perspective acknowledges that democracy has a moral purpose and rationale which is that the well-being of society is dependent “not only upon the correctness and rationality of government policies but also on public confidence that previously settled methods, procedures and rules of politics and government will not be violated or arbitrarily changed but in fact preserved” (Obadan, Oshionebo and Uga, 2002).

3.2 A Broader Idea of Government “Governance”

The main concern of governance is the exercise of state power and authority. In any modern economy, the following take place:

- (i) The government expectedly establishes and maintains some institutions to regulate social and economic relations through the instrumentality of the law;
- (ii) The institutions established regulate the relationship between the government and its citizens;
- (iii) The institutions facilitate effective performance appraisal of the policies, programmes and activities of government; and
- (iv) The institutions ensure that rewards and penalties are dispensed as appropriate.

It is in view of the foregoing that governance can be simply defined as the exercise of power by government to control and manage the society.

Governance has been used by some (Serageldin and Landell-Mills, 1991) in a practical sense to describe the nature and style of a political system, encompassing the type of political regime, political authority channels and processes, institutional and structural arrangements, decision making processes, the flow of information, and the nature of the relationship between the state and the society. Some others use the term in a normative context linked with democracy and human rights. In this sense, governance has been used to refer to the legitimacy of government (that is, the degree of democratization), accountability of political and official functionaries of government, the transparency of decision making, including media freedom and mechanisms that ensure accountability for decisions taken by the government, and the level of respect for human rights and the rule of law (ACBF, 1995).

Specifically, governance refers to the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development (World Bank, 1992). In other words, it is the use of political authority and exercise of control over a society and the management of resources (Wai 1995). It is the framework for the organisation and management of the state so as to create the environment necessary for deploying all the competences of a society for the development of that economy and removing some of the constraints and impediments to such long-term efforts. From a development perspective, therefore, governance is the efficiency and effectiveness of a government in promoting the economic well-being of its people. The term cannot be divorced from economic survival and the improvement of the well-being of the populace. Since development is the bottom line, a more dynamic view of good governance is for it to encompass all facets of human development activities, including poverty eradication, environmental improvement and gender equity.

Development is so central to governance that Ariyo (1999) concludes that "the effective management of the economy is the overall concern and focus of governance". From that standpoint, he goes on to suggest that governance "encompasses the creation of an enabling environment for the harnessing and effective utilization of the nation's resources"

3.3 *Dimensions of Governance*

Three dimensions of governance are identifiable. The three dimensions are political, economic and social governance. Political governance refers to those processes by which a society reaches a consensus on regulations to manage its affairs and subsequently implement them. Economic governance relates to the mix of policies, processes and organisational mechanisms needed for the production and distribution of goods and services. Social governance addresses the underlying values and beliefs guiding a society's behaviour and decision-making. All these three dimensions are interrelated. Social governance provides the moral or ethical foundation for political and economic governance. Economic governance provides the material foundations for social and political governance. And political governance is the basic organisational dynamic for social and economic governance. As would be expected, it is by virtue of this dynamics that governance becomes a factor of order and cohesion in a society.

3.4 *Determining the Quality of Governance*

The quality of governance in a given economy is determined by the extent of the availability of certain institutions or processes in that economy. When all of them are allowed to function properly, the level of governance is said to be good. This explains why the level of governance is a matter of degree from bad to good. These institutions/processes (Global Coalition for Africa, 1994) include:

- (i) Constitutional provisions that guarantee human and property rights;

- (ii) Predictability and rule of law (that is the proper functioning of the legal system);
- (iii) Consistency in administration and the bureaucracy (irrespective of the political regime or leadership);
- (iv) Open and tolerant political system;
- (v) Accountability and transparency in government activities;(vi)
- (vi) Mass participation in, and widespread communication of, policy decisions and programmes; and
- (vii) Favourable (enabling) environment for the promotion and growth of private sector activity.

3.5 Characteristics of Good Governance

The core attributes of good governance can be summarised as follows:

- (i) Accountability of government and its institutions and officials for their decisions and actions;
- (ii) The existence of institutions and mechanisms to enforce government accountability and to redress transgressions;
- (iii) Transparency in government decision-making, procedures, processes, contracts, appointments, etc, so as to prevent corruption and enhance economic efficiency;
- (iv) Consistency in government decision-making and actions such that government behaviour is predictable;
- (v) Openness and availability of information about government decisions and actions, and public access to such information;
- (vi) Introduction of the Rule of Law for the conduct of government business; governments, institutions and private actors in the economic arena should be subjected to rules and regulations which everyone in the society understands;

- (vii) Mass participation and empowerment of the people;
- (viii) Interactions among and within the state, civil society and the private sector so as to satisfy the political, economic and social dimensions of good governance; and
- (ix) Value-for-money auditing of government activities and programmes.

It should be noted that a nation may have all the resources but corruption and the other components of bad governance as well as bad policies will vitiate this endowment and detract from all efforts at economic growth and development. But what are these elements of bad governance?

3.6 *Features of Bad Governance*

Bad governance is generally characterized by such problems, among others, as pervasive corruption, lack of public accountability and the "capture" of public services by the elites. The World Bank (1992) identifies the following as among the many features of bad governance:

- (i) Failure to make a clear separation between what is public and what is private, hence the tendency to divert public resources for private gain;
- (ii) Failure to establish a predictable framework for law and government behaviour in a manner that is conducive to development, or arbitrariness in the application of rules and laws;
- (iii) Excessive rules, regulations, licensing requirements, etc, which impede the functioning of markets and encourage rent-seeking;
- (iv) Priorities that are inconsistent with development, thus, resulting in a misallocation of resources;
- (v) Excessive narrow base for, or nontransparent, decision-making.

Collectively, these negative practices create an environment that is inimical to development. By entailing corruption and lack of accountability and transparency, bad governance provides opportunities for rent-

seeking and for the elites and interest groups that are well connected to plunder and corner public resources, including public services, at the expense of the entire citizenry.

3.7 *III-Effects of Bad Governance*

There is no gain-saying it that the absence of transparency and accountability in public transaction and the consequent corruption have a negative impact on development. This negative impact is aptly summarised by Obadan (1998) as follows:

- (i) It reduces public revenue and increases public spending, thus contributing to large fiscal deficits and making it more difficult for a government to run a sound fiscal policy;
- (ii) It reduces investment and the productivity of public investment and infrastructure;
- (iii) It tends to increase income inequality by allowing those in influential positions to take advantage of government activities at the expense of the rest of the population;
- (iv) By distorting markets and the allocation of resources, corruption interferes with government's ability to impose necessary regulatory controls and inspections to correct for market failures and reduces or distorts the fundamental role of government - for example, in the areas of enforcing contracts and protecting property rights;
- (v) By undermining the legitimacy of the market economy and perhaps of democracy; and
- (vi) By reducing foreign direct investment, because corruption has the effect of a tax.

To these, we may add the following (Nkrumah, 1999):

- (i) Corruption distorts the reward system and distribution of national income in favour of those who indulge in it.

- (ii) It destroys incentive for hard work and productive behaviour.
- (iii) Because corruption gives unfair advantage to the corrupter, it may inefficiently allocate resources and reduce competition, and therefore it retards economic development.
- (iv) In the area of tax administration, corruption results in loss of revenue to the government whether national or local.
- (v) It inflates public expenditure as the corrupter adds what he has invested in corruption to the real contract price.
- (vi) In the area of administration of justice, corrupt practices result in perversion and denial of justice.
- (vii) Finally, ultimately, corruption provides an excuse for political adventurers to subvert democratic regimes, paving the way for political instability.

It is because of these crippling influences of corruption that dealing with the phenomenon has been perceived as being crucially important. As the United Nations (1993) aptly acknowledges, "corrupt activities of public officials can destroy the potential effectiveness of all types of governmental programs, hinder development, and victimize individuals and groups".

4. NEPAD: Origin, Mission and Objectives

The New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD) is Africa's response to her monumental development challenge which we highlighted in Section 2. It is the product of a fusion of two African development initiatives as directed by the OAU Extraordinary Summit in Libya in March 2001. Following that directive, the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme (MAPP) sponsored by Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria was merged with the OMEGA Plan which was conceived and sponsored by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. The merged document was re-presented to the OAU Summit of July 2001,

in Lusaka under the name of Presidents Obasanjo, Mbeki, Bouteflika, Wade and Mubarak. The Summit endorsed and adopted the initiative which was first called the New African Initiative but was later changed to the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

NEPAD appears to mean many things to many people. To some observers, it is a vision for Africa's development. It represents the last and best hope for the authentic development of Africa after many years of post-independence false starts and lost hope. To some others, it is Africa's "Marshall Plan" which provides a potentially effective framework for the continent's movement towards development. These two perspectives on NEPAD appropriately reflect the fact that it is a holistic integrated strategic development plan to enhance growth and to reduce poverty in Africa. NEPAD impresses as a comprehensive address of the key social, economic and political development priorities of Africa and in a coherent and balanced manner. The NEPAD document (2001) accordingly sees the development initiative as:

"a pledge by African leaders, based on a common vision and a firm and shared conviction, that they have a pressing duty to eradicate poverty and to place their countries, both individually and collectively, on a path of sustainable growth and development and, at the same time, to participate actively in the world economy and body politic"

The Programme is, therefore, anchored on a rare determination by African leaders to use the framework to extricate the continent and its peoples "from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a globalising world" (NEPAD, 2001). The "poverty and backwardness of Africa" is seen as standing "in stark contrast to the prosperity of the developed world", a situation which NEPAD sees as "abnormal" but reversible.

NEPAD is therefore a long-term vision of an "African-owned and African-led development programme" which hopes, in the long run, to "eradicate

poverty in Africa and place African countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and thus halt the marginalisation of Africa in the globalization process". It hopes to be able to achieve this long-term objective by achieving and sustaining an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of over 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years.

The primary objective of NEPAD is to promote the development of African countries collectively and individually through a consolidation of "democracy and sound economic management". The expectation is that in the process, poverty would be eradicated, the marginalisation of Africa would be reversed and the continent would experience beneficial integration into the global economy. Trade, investment, human development, capacity building, infrastructural development, among others, are the building blocks of the NEPAD initiative.

A number of directive principles inform NEPAD's operations and guide its programme implementation. These include:

- (i) Democracy and good governance;
- (ii) Sound economic management;
- (iii) People-centred development
- (iv) Peace, security and stability;
- (v) Restraint on arbitrary action by government;
- (vi) Ownership of the process by African leaders and people through their participation in the process;
- (vii) Dependence of Africa's development on its resources and the capacity of the African people but without prejudice to the anticipated collaboration with development partners. In this regard, members of the Implementation Committee of NEPAD have already had a series of meetings with some development partners, notably the G8 in Genoa, Italy in 2001, in Kananski, Canada in 2002 and in Evian, France in 2003;
- (viii) A strong political commitment by African leaders to the success of NEPAD. In this connection, there is a promise "to hold each other accountable in terms of the agreements" in the Programme.

Three discernible strategies provide the framework within which NEPAD's objectives are being pursued. These are (Yahaya, 2003):

- (i) Establishing the necessary conditions for sustainable development, including measures to strengthen a private sector-led economy, the management of the economy for macro-economic stability and growth, the consolidation and sustenance of plural democracy, the promotion of regional cooperation, and strengthening conflict prevention, management and resolution;
- (ii) The identification of priority projects that will transform African development and governance programmes into success stories, and the continent from poverty and backwardness to prosperity and global competitiveness; and
- (iii) The mobilization of resources within and outside Africa for the effective implementation of policies, programmes and projects.

It should be re-iterated, however, that thoughtful as these implementation strategies appear to be, they can only be successfully operationalised in an environment that cherishes and respects good governance as a value. The next section discusses how much of a desideratum good governance is to the success of NEPAD.

5. NEPAD and Good Governance

5.1 *Regretting the Past and Promising a Better Future*

Claude Ake, a renowned Professor of Political Economy, contends that development "is not for a people who do not know who they are and where they are coming from, for such people are unlikely to know where they are going". African leaders, as Amuwo (2003) suggests, may not have fully appreciated "the nature and character of the global system they are dealing with (including their consequent belief) that genuine partnership is possible between them and their Western counterparts" but they seem resolved to address the governance issues that have detracted from Africa's development. All through the NEPAD document, there is a

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